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"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...
to be confronted with the witnesses against him. . .
I. INTRODUCTION
What exactly does the Confrontation Clause mean? For the past
seven years, Justice Antonin "Nino" Scalia has been the unlikely
champion of the defense bar as the author of Crawford v. Washington2
and of the majority/plurality decisions in (almost) all of the post-
Crawford confrontation cases. The Supreme Court's recent dramatic
resurrection of the Confrontation Clause has generated a flurry of
activity in the federal and state courts and among legal scholars. The
recent and rapidly evolving constitutional doctrine purports to protect a
vital trial right and to enshrine core historical concerns. According to
Justice Scalia in Crawford, "[w]here testimonial statements are at issue,
the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional
demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation."3
In 2004, Crawford seemed to change everything for all federal and
state criminal defendants by replacing the pre-existing "inherently, and
therefore permanently unpredictable"" admissibility standards (borrowed
from the rules of evidence) with a new categorical constitutional rule.
After Crawford, prosecutors could no longer rely on state or federal
rules of evidence.' Instead, for all statements deemed testimonial by the
trial court either the witness must be subjected to the "crucible of cross-
examination," 6 or her statement excluded. Crawford created a new
threshold confrontation requirement that lower courts identify
"testimonial statements." However, both in and after Crawford, the
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
3. See id. at 68-69 (emphasis added).
4. Id. at 68 n.10.
S. Id. at 51.
6. Id. at 61.
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Court has repeatedly refused to provide clear or consistent criteria
distinguishing testimonial statements from the infinite range of out-of-
court statements made by victims and witnesses during criminal
investigations.7 Without clear guidance, the lower courts have generated
confused and inconsistent confrontation decisions.
Until very recently, Justice Scalia has steered the Court's modem
confrontation jurisprudence. However, as discussed below, his
leadership is increasingly threatened by deep divisions on questions of
historical accuracy, constitutional interpretation, and the practical
realities of twenty-first century criminal prosecutions. By June 2009,
Justice Scalia could barely muster a plurality for his Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts9 decision that confrontation extends to expert forensic lab
analysts relying on a razor-thin fifth-vote concurrence from Justice
Thomas, explicitly limited to his own long-held view that the
Confrontation Clause applies only to formalized statements.'0 Melendez-
Diaz also provoked a lengthy, vitriolic, and revealing dissent from
Justice Kennedy who wrote for Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito
and Breyer."
The four Melendez-Diaz dissenters, who (unlike half of the
plurality) remain on the Court today, objected to this expansive
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause on three grounds. First, the
Court's post-Crawford focus on testimonial statements had lost sight of
the fact that the question should be whether the declarant was a
"witness" because that is "the word the Framers used in the
Confrontation Clause."' 2 Building on this argument, they argued that
"witness" should be limited to the conventional/adversarial prosecution
witnesses and not extended to prosecution experts who have "witnessed
nothing to give them personal knowledge of the defendant's guilt."' 3
Finally, the dissenters predicted that Melendez-Diaz would have the
practical effect of "disrupt[ing] forensic investigations across the country
7. See Michael H. Graham, Crawford/Davis "Testimonial" Interpreted Removing the
Clutter; Application Summary, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 811, 813 (2008).
8. See id. at 813 (noting that after the Crawford Court's failure to define testimonial
statements "it was not surprising that lower courts immediately employed a plethora of
interpretations of'testimonial' leading to conflicting results").
9. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
10. Id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring).
11. Id. at 2543-61 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
12. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 2543 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that the plurality "makes no attempt to
acknowledge the real differences between laboratory analysts who perform scientific tests and other,
more conventional witnesses").
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and to put[ting] prosecutions nationwide at risk of dismissal based on
erratic, all-too-frequent instances when a particular laboratory
technician, now invested by the Court's new constitutional designation
as the analyst, simply does not or cannot appear."l 4
A. The Impact ofNew and Upcoming Confrontation Cases
The Supreme Court is revisiting the scope of the Confrontation
Clause and the definition of "testimonial statements" twice this term.
On March 1, 2010, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Michigan v.
Bryant" and the case was decided on February 28, 2011 (when this
Article was in the final editing phase). As predicted and discussed
below, the Bryant majority (which included all four of the Melendez-
Diaz dissenters) has retreated from seven years of Scalia-lead post-
Crawford confrontation expansion. The Court held oral argument in its
second confrontation case, Bullcoming v. New Mexico,16 on March 2,
2011. In Bullcoming, the Court will explore the scope of Melendez-Diaz
when it decides whether live trial testimony from a "surrogate" expert
witness who did not prepare the defendant's certified (but unsworn)
blood alcohol report, but worked in the same lab, satisfies the
confrontation requirement.' 7
In Bryant, the Court addressed the question of whether police
interrogation of a bleeding gunshot victim while he lay on the ground at
a gas station just hours before died yielded "testimonial statements"
under the Confrontation Clause.'8 Justice Sotomayor, who wrote for a
Bryant majority that included the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy,
Breyer, and Alito, (with Justice Thomas concurring in the result, Justices
Scalia and Ginsburg dissenting separately, and Justice Kagan recused)
found that admission of the victim's statement did not violate the
Confrontation Clause because "the circumstances of the interaction
between Covington and the police objectively indicate that the 'primary
purpose of the interrogation' was 'to enable police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency."" 9 In briefs and during oral argument, petitioner,
respondent, and a range of amici, had relied on Davis v. Washington20 to
14. Id. at 2549 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
15. Michigan v. Bryant, 130 S. Ct. 1685 (2010).
16. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010).
17. Id.
18. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143.
19. Id. at 1150 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)).
20. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
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frame the constitutional question as a determination of the objective
primary purpose of the interrogation.21
Five years earlier in Davis v. Washington (and its consolidated
companion case Hammon v. Indiana22), the Court explored two
statements from opposite ends of the mid-investigation interrogation
spectrum.
In Davis, Michelle McCottry made statements to the police during a
frantic 911 call while she was being assaulted. The Court held that this
statement was non-testimonial because it was made "under
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency." 23
In contrast, Amy Hammon prepared a written "battery affidavit"
following a secured-scene kitchen table police interview.2 4 Here, the
circumstances objectively indicated that there was no contemporaneous
ongoing emergency so the Court presumed that the statements were
testimonial because "the primary purpose of the interrogation was to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to a later criminal
prosecution."25
During the recent October 5, 2010 oral arguments in Bryant, Justice
Scalia reiterated the constitutional significance of the two different
circumstances noting that "[t]he crime was ongoing-in Davis when-
when the woman was on the phone with the operator.... [and] she was
seeking help from the emergency that was occurring to her at that
moment."2 6 Bryant, like most mid-investigation interrogations, falls
somewhere between the two extremes.
Stop for a minute and imagine the mental gymnastics of attempting
to divine whether the reasonable about-to-bleed-to-death gunshot victim
contemplates that identifying his assailant will: (1) help the police to
resolve an ongoing emergency; or (2) provide evidence useful to the
prosecution. The justices use oral argument for a range of analytic,
rhetorical, and persuasive purposes. However, in Bryant, the illogica
and inoperability of the Crawford/Davis standard were flagrantly
displayed. Justice Alito called the objective primary purpose of the
21. See infra Section IV (discussing the briefs filed in Michigan v. Bryant, cert. granted, 130
S. Ct. 1685 (2010)).
22. 546 U.S. 976 (2005).
23. Davis, 547 U.S at 822.
24. Id. at 819-20.
25. Id. at 822.
26. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (No. 09-
150), 2010 WL 3907894.
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interrogation standard "totally artificial" because the reasonable
declarant may think "[m]y primary purpose in saying this is so that they
can respond to an ongoing emergency. . . . [but] I also have the purpose
of giving them information that could be used at trial."27 Justice
Ginsburg opined that examining the actions of the police would not be
enlightening because "if you want to know what happened, you'd ask
the very same questions. . . . [because] the questions are relevant also to
securing the situation."28  As the argument progressed, the manifold
ambiguities of this standard continued to surface as the Court wrestled
with questions that included: (1) whether all (or most) violent crimes
committed by unapprehended perpetrators should be considered
"ongoing emergencies;" (2) whose perception (that of the police or the
victim/witness) should control; (3) how to reconcile or choose among
dual or conflicting purposes; (4) whether all statements regarding past
events (or even all questions phrased in the past tense) resulted in
testimonial statements; and (5) whether the existence of an ongoing
emergency (not mentioned in the statement itself) could properly be
inferred from the facts.29
Professor Richard D. Friedman, as amicus to the Bryant
respondent, argued that the proposed "primary investigatory purpose
standard" should be no problem for future courts because it parallels the
constitutional standards used to determine custody (under Miranda) or
reasonable expectations of privacy and reasonable stops and seizures
(under the Fourth Amendment). 30  However, this argument does not
withstand scrutiny. The Miranda and Fourth Amendment standards ask
judges to pick between two mutually exclusive alternatives (i.e., a
suspect either believes she is in custody, or believes she is not in
custody; a person either has a reasonable expectation of privacy, or she
does not). The fundamental problem with the "primary investigatory
purpose standard" is that in many cases it will be logical and consistent
for the victim/witness and the police officer to believe that a statement
could help to resolve an ongoing emergency now and later prove useful
at trial.
The Bryant decision has amplified the confrontation confusion.
Justice Sotomayor employs a scattershot approach that careens among a
range of possible confrontation factors including: (1) "the statements
27. Id. at 8.
28. Id. at 5.
29. See infra Section IV (discussing the October 5, 2010 Bryant oral argument).
30. See Brief of Richard D. Friedman, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 11,
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (No. 09-150), 2010 WL 2565284.
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and actions of both the declarant and interrogators;"31 (2) whether the
ongoing emergency posed a threat to the public at large; 32 (3) the
"informality in an encounter between a victim and police;" 3 (4) "the
parties' perception that an emergency is ongoing;" 34 (5) whether "the
cause of the shooting was a purely private dispute"35; (6) whether the
assailant used a gun;36 (7) whether, at the time of the interrogation, the
police knew the location of the assailant;37 and (8) whether the police
asked the "type of questions necessary to allow the police to 'assess the
situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the
potential victim' and to the public."3  To add to the confusion, the
Bryant majority suggests new, but undefined confrontation exceptions
(beyond the Davis Court's "ongoing emergencies" exception) noting that
some out-of-court statements-where the objective primary purpose of
the investigation was not to resolve an ongoing emergency-do not raise
confrontation concerns. Moreover, for the first time since Crawford,
the Court seems to reconsider the reliability of the out-of-court
statement, noting that, "[i)n making the primary purpose determination,
31. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1160 (2011). The Bryant Court actually
recommended a "combined approach" to assessing the purpose of the declarant and interrogators
suggesting that this could help to resolve the "[p]redominant ... problem of mixed motives on the
part of interrogators and declarants." Id. at 1161. This "combined approach" is both difficult to
apply (e.g., do the presumed objective intents of the witness/victim and the police have the same
weight?) and would fail to resolve the frequent problem of dual or conflicting motives (i.e., the
victim/witness and/or the police intend to respond to an ongoing emergency and develop evidence).
32. Id. at 1161. According to the Bryant majority, "[an assessment of whether an emergency
that threatens the police and public is ongoing cannot narrowly focus on whether the threat solely to
the first victim has been neutralized because the threat to first responders and to public may
continue." Id. at 1158. "[Tlhe duration and scope of an emergency may [also] depend in part on
the type of weapon employed," id., and/or "[t]he medical condition of the victim,"(to the extent that
the victim's condition sheds light on the purpose for her statement or the magnitude of any ongoing
safety threat). Id. at 1159.
33. Id. at 1160 (emphasis in original). According to Justice Sotomayor, the Michigan
Supreme Court had "too readily dismissed the informality of the circumstances in this case," id.,
despite the fact that "the questioning in this case occurred in an exposed, public area, prior to the
arrival of emergency medical services, and in a disorganized fashion." Id. Moreover, "[t]he
informality suggests that the interrogators' primary purpose was simply to address what they
perceived to be an ongoing emergency, and the circumstances lacked any formality that would have
alerted Covington to or focused him on the possible future prosecutorial use of his statements." Id.
at 1166.
34. Id. at 1162 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 1163.
36. Id.atlt64.
37. Id,
38. Id. at 1165 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832 (2006)).
39. Id. at 1155 ("But there may be other circumstances, aside from ongoing emergencies,
when a statement is not procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for
trial testimony."). Id. (emphasis in original).
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standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as
reliable, will be relevant." 0 Any return to an Ohio v. Roberts approach
to confrontation would be an unwelcome development, especially for
Crawford's author and champion.
The recent Bryant decision infuriated Justice Scalia who has lost
control of the Court's confrontation jurisprudence. With trademark
vitriol, he accused the majority of accepting police lies "so transparently
false that professing to believe . . . [them] demeans this institution,"
joining in an "opinion [that] distorts our Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence and leaves it in a shambles," and "[i]nstead of clarifying
the law, [making] the Court . . . itself the obfuscator of last resort."A'
Justice Scalia excoriated Justice Sotomayor for writing a decision that
"is not only a gross distortion of the facts[,] . .. . [but] a gross distortion
of the law-a revisionist narrative in which reliability continues to guide
our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, at least where emergencies and
faux emergencies are concerned., 2 In his view, Bryant will also have
serious and deleterious real world ramifications because the majority's
"distorted view creates an expansive exception to the Confrontation
Clause for violent crimes. Bryant is clearly a bitter pill for Justice
Scalia, who according to Linda Greenwald, used his dissent to
"administer ... a public thrashing to a junior colleague" not just because
"Justice Scalia doesn't like to lose," but because he is "approaching his
25" anniversary as a Supreme Court justice [and] has cast a long shadow
but has accomplished surprisingly little . . .. [because n]early every time
he has come close to achieving one of his jurisprudential goals, his
colleagues have either hung back at the last minute, or feeling buyer's
remorse, retreated at the next opportunity.""
The ramifications of Bryant will redound to both criminal practice
and constitutional interpretation. In practice, Justice Scalia is likely
correct that Bryant will lead to the admission of more prosecutor-
sponsored statements that defendants cannot exclude from witnesses
whom defendants cannot confront. However, as a constitutional
standard, Justice Thomas is equally correct that the Bryant majority's
objective primary purpose of the interrogation inquiry is an "exercise in
fiction" that effectively "illustrates the uncertainty that this test creates
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
42. Id at 1174.
43. Id.at 1173.
44. Linda Greenhouse, Justice Scalia Objects, OPINIONATOR, NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 9,
2011, 8:40PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/09/justice-scalia-objects/.
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for law enforcement and the lower courts."45 Bryant will almost
inevitably exacerbate the problem of erratic and inconsistent decisions as
our state and federal criminal courts continue to search for the sine qua
non of the "testimonial statement."
A careful examination of the post-Crawford cases, including
revelations from the recent Bryant briefs and oral argument, provides
insight into possible future alternatives. With Justice Scalia's role in the
Court's confrontation jurisprudence on the wane, there is a new
opportunity for the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Breyer and Alito
to gain traction to reframe the confrontation inquiry. This reframed
confrontation standard is also likely to focus less on the testimonial
qualities of the out-of-court statement and more on the status of the
declarant as a "witness[] against the accused." Clearly, a more textually
accurate constitutional inquiry would appeal to the four Melendez-Diaz
dissenters who remind us that "witness," rather than "testimonial
statement" is "the word the Framers used in the Confrontation Clause.""
In Melendez-Diaz these four justices adopted the rigid view that
prosecution-sponsored experts were, by definition, not "witnesses
against the accused" because they "witnessed nothing to give them
personal knowledge of the defendant's guilt."47 After Melendez-Diaz,
this argument may be untenable, although this is debatable given Justice
Thomas's concurrence. However, if we assume as a general matter that
the act of serving as a witness requires a measure of formality, this shift
should gain purchase with Justice Thomas who, although he concurred
in both Melendez-Diaz and Bryant, has been a long-standing, consistent,
and prescient critic of the Court's confrontation jurisprudence.
For the sound administration of justice in our criminal courts, it is
vital that judges have a confrontation standard that they can understand
and operate. It makes some sense that judges can more readily ascertain
from the facts and circumstances whether an out-of-court declarant was
acting as a "witnesses against the accused"48 (e.g., from evidence of
police control over the location, duration, and structure of the
victim/witness interview or evidence of any attempt by the police to
45. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1167 (Thomas, J., concurring).
46. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527,2543 (2009).
47. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that the plurality "makes no attempt to acknowledge
the real differences between laboratory analysts who perform scientific tests and other, more
conventional witnesses-'witnesses' being the word the Framers used in the Confrontation
Clause").
48. Id. at 2553 (quoting Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911)).
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shape the statement for use in a future criminal trial49) than they can
discern the objective primary purpose of the investigation. However,
textual accuracy and operational efficacy bring their own costs. There is
strong evidence that an analytic shift towards the act of witnessing and
away from the testimonial nature of the statement could be used to
narrow the scope of confrontation. As discussed below, this could
impact defendants' ability to challenge the admission of evidence under
Bruton v. United States,so incentivize the creation of new law
enforcement confrontation workarounds, and diminish the accuracy of a
wide range of public records."
B. Justice Thomas and the Future of the Confrontation Clause
Almost twenty years ago, Justice Thomas predicted that a
confrontation doctrine that "[a]ttempts to draw a line between statements
made in contemplation of legal proceedings and those not so made
would entangle the courts in a multitude of difficulties."52 After
Crawford, and especially after Davis, he has continued to oppose a
confrontation standard that asked judges to reconstruct the objective
primary purpose of the interrogation. According to Justice Thomas, this
inquiry not only creates "uncertainty . . . for law enforcement,"53 it is
unnecessary. The Confrontation Clause, in his view, applies only to
"formalized testimonial materials such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions [because i]t was this discrete category of
testimonial materials that was historically abused by prosecutors as a
means of depriving criminal defendants of the benefits of the adversary
process."5 4
The Crawford and Davis Courts considered the formality of each
out-of-court statement and these concerns also emerged in Bryant.
During oral argument, petitioner's counsel began by focusing on the
informality of the police interview of Anthony Covington, which was
conducted while he lay bleeding on the street. At the time, Justice
Scalia dismissed petitioner's argument stating simply that "[flormality or
49. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, infra note 175, at
17.
50. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
51. See infra Part VI.
52. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 364 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (emphasis
added).
53. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1160, 1167 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring).
54. White, 502 U.S. at 364 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
55. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 2.
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no formality has nothing to do with it." 6 However, the Bryant decision
suggests that Justice Scalia is now significantly outnumbered by Justices
who view formality as a relevant confrontation criterion.
The Bryant Court addressed formality in two ways. First, as a
general matter, the Court found that "the most important instances in
which the Clause restricts the introduction of out-of-court statements are
those in which state actors are involved in a formal, out-of-court
interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence for trial."57 Formal out-of-
court interrogations are the most egregious confrontation violations
because the "basic purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to 'targe[t]'
the sort of 'abuses' exemplified at the notorious treason trial of Sir
Walter Raleigh."5 8 Second, more specifically, the Court concluded that
the Michigan Supreme Court had "too readily dismissed the informality
of the circumstances in this case," 59 despite the fact that "the questioning
. . . [had] occurred in an exposed, public area, prior to the arrival of
emergency medical services, and in a disorganized fashion."60  The
Bryant Court recognized the constitutional significance of the fact that
"Covington interacted with the police under highly informal
circumstances as he bled from a fatal gunshot wound."6 ' According to
Justice Sotomayor, this "informality suggests that the interrogators'
primary purpose was simply to address what they perceived to be an
ongoing emergency" 62 and "the circumstances [also] lacked any
formality that would have alerted Covington to or focused him on the
possible future prosecutorial use of his statements.'
If a majority of the Court agrees that formal statements are the most
egregious confrontation violations, this raises interesting questions about
the durability of the Court's adherence to its new objective primary
purpose of the investigation standard. Perhaps, as Justice Sotomayor has
suggested, the formality of an interrogation sometimes reveals
something about what the reasonable victim/witness and the reasonable
police office intended. However, formality emerges as a determinative
confrontation criterion only if the inquiry shifts towards the textually
accurate question of whether the out-of-court declarant was acting as a
"witness[] against the accused" when she made her statement because
56. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 4.
57. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155 (emphasis added).
58. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)).
59. Id.atll60.
60. Id.
61. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1167 (Thomas, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 1166.
63. Id.
12212011] FINDING NINO
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acting as a witness, as Justice Thomas has observed, requires "a
solemnity to the process that is not present in a mere conversation.""
C. Testing the Boundaries of Traditional Legal Scholarship
The Court is in the midst of a dramatic exploration of the
parameters of the Confrontation Clause and the pragmatics of its
operation. Justice Scalia is no longer steering the confrontation ship,
and Crawford/Davis/Bryant have created a new objective primary
purpose of the interrogation standard that is difficult to comprehend and
(probably) impossible to operate.
This Article is an attempt to respond promptly to these new
developments and to predict some of the post-Scalia trajectory of the
Court's confrontation doctrine. In many ways, this project reflects a
desire to challenge the more traditional law review process to respond
more promptly to a dynamic area of legal development. I am grateful to
the editors of the Akron Law Review for their indulgence in this effort,
as we have worked hard over the past few months to incorporate new
developments as soon as they occurred.
Roughly speaking, the introductory sections of the Article briefly
set the stage for analysis of the new and future confrontation cases. Part
II begins with the past, providing a brief analysis of the pre-Crawford
cases to explain how confrontation was merged into the rules of
evidence. Part III explores the importance of Crawford and the Court's
post-Crawford confrontation jurisprudence. Part IV examines the new
constitutional framework created by Michigan v. Bryant. Part V
anticipates the role of new and emerging perspectives on the Court. Part
VI advances a two-pronged confrontation responsive to recent concerns
but consistent with post-Crawford precedent. Finally, the conclusion of
the Article evaluates the likely legal and social costs disadvantages of a
clarified (more narrow) confrontation standard including a brief
discussion of the growing threat to confrontation challenges under
Bruton v. United States.6 5
64. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 838 (2006).
65. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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II. HEARSAY AND CONFRONTATION
A. The Shared Goal ofReliable Evidence
By the end of the last century, the right to be "confronted" with a
witness had long been settled to mean the right for defendant's counsel
66to cross-examine the witness in the defendant's presence. The
principal area of confrontation controversy involved the determination of
which out-of-court statements (i.e., which hearsay that was otherwise
admissible under federal/state evidentiary rules) must be excluded for
lack of confrontation. These decisions rested almost entirely on
determinations of evidentiary reliability because, as the courts somewhat
naively and wholly conveniently presumed, the defendant's right to
confrontation served this same goal.
By 1980, in Ohio v. Roberts, the Confrontation Clause had
become the handmaiden of the rules of evidence. The Roberts Court held
that confrontation serves simply to "augment accuracy in the fact finding
process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test adverse
evidence."70 Thus, the Court found that the right is satisfied whenever
the evidence proffered against the defendant is deemed reliable.
According to the Roberts Court, since hearsay and the Confrontation
Clause "'stem from the same roots"' 7 ' and "'are generally designed to
protect similar values,"' 7 2 defendants have no independent constitutional
right to confront reliable/trustworthy out-of-court statements made by
unavailable prosecution witnesses.73 After Roberts, a defendant's right
to confrontation was satisfied whenever the court found that the
statement either: (1) fit within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception;" 74 or
(2) had "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 75 This decision
entirely ignored the panoply of strategic defense goals served by the
cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. It also ensured that federal
and state prosecutors could continue to rely on a wide range of
66. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895) ("The substance of the
constitutional protection is preserved to the prisoner in the advantage .. . of seeing the witness face
to face, and of subjecting him to the ordeal of cross-examination.").
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
70. Id. at 65.
71. Id. at 66 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970)).
72. Id. (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970)).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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inculpatory out-of-court statements whenever the evidence had survived
defense hearsay challenges or was not challenged.
B. The Futility of Confronting Reliable Evidence
Twelve years later, the Court decided White v. Illinois,76 the
apotheosis of the subjugation of confrontation to evidence law. White
was a sexual assault case involving out-of-court statements from a four-
year-old alleged victim. The White Court found that the Confrontation
Clause did not require that the prosecution produce the witness or
establish her unavailability.7 7 The Court also held that the defendant
was not entitled to cross-examine the alleged victim because her
statements fell within the "excited utterance" and "statements for the
medical treatment" exceptions to the hearsay rule. However, the most
interesting and overlooked component of White decision was the Court's
conclusion that cross-examination of an alleged sexual assault victim is
futile and unnecessary whenever the out-of-court "statement . . .
qualifies for admission under a 'firmly rooted' hearsay exception
[because it] is so trustworthy that adversarial testing can be expected to
add little to its reliability."7 9
Even if we accept the White Court's unrealistic premise that cross-
examination is solely (or even principally) a truth-finding endeavor, the
Court's assertion that defense cross-examination of an alleged crime
victim will do nothing to test the reliability of her allegations is patently
absurd.o In effect, the White Court made explicit what had been
implicit just two years earlier in Ohio v. Roberts- confrontation had
devolved into an ephemeral right that could be denied whenever a
criminal court judge deemed the out-of-court statement reliable or the
defendant failed to object to the admission of the evidence. This near
abolition of the right of confrontation by the White majority provoked
rebuke from the newest member of the Court.
76. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
77. Id. at 350-58.
78. Id. at 357.
79. Id. (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820-21 (1990) (emphasis added)).
80. It is worth contrasting this with the Supreme Court's earlier assertions that cross
examination is "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth," California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970), and "the principal means by which the believability of a witness
and the truth of his testimony are tested." Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974).
1224 [44:1211
C. Justice Thomas Objects
In a concurring opinion written more than a decade before
Crawford, Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Scalia) politely warned that
"our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has evolved in a manner that is
perhaps inconsistent with the text and the history of the Clause itself . . .
[which has] complicated and confused the relationship between the
constitutional right of confrontation and the hearsay rules of evidence."8'
Although Justice Thomas conceded that "[t]here is virtually no evidence
of what the drafters of the Confrontation Clause intended it to mean,"82
the "strictest reading" would limit confrontation to those witnesses who
appear and testify at trial. However, this interpretation of "witness" as
limited to trial witnesses would, Justice Thomas conceded, conflict with
the history of confrontation at common law which had long considered
the defendant's right to confront a range of out-of-court statements. 84
Justice Thomas's most prescient observation was that the Court
should consider the profound risk of creating a confrontation
jurisprudence that requires judges to "[a]ttempt[] to draw a line between
statements made in contemplation of legal proceedings and those not so
made[, which] would entangle the courts in a multitude of difficulties."
The United States (as amicus curiae) had argued "that the Confrontation
Clause should apply only to those persons who provide in-court
testimony or the functional equivalent, such as affidavits, depositions, or
confessions that are made in contemplation of legal proceedings."86
Justice Thomas agreed, noting that "the Confrontation Clause is
implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained
in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions."
III. CRA WFORD V. WASHINGTON AND A NEW CONFRONTATION RULE
"Among the biggest news in criminal procedure over the
past few years- certainly the news with the largest impact
on criminal trials in this country- has been the Supreme
81. White, 502 U.S. at 358 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
82. Id. at 359.
83. Id..
84. Id. at 361-63.
85. Id. at 364.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 365 (emphasis added).
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Court's dramatic reinterpretation of the Confrontation
Clause in Crawford v. Washington .... "8 8
It took the Supreme Court twelve more years to agree that Justices
Thomas and Scalia were right about two things: (1) the centrality of the
text and the history of the Confrontation Clause; and (2) the problem of
tethering their constitutional jurisprudence to the federal and state
evidence rules.
A. The Crawford Decision
In 2004, Crawford v. Washington resurrected the Confrontation
Clause by cleanly severing its ties to "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions
and all other indicia of evidentiary reliability.89 Crawford involved the
admission of a tape-recorded, out-of-court statement obtained from the
defendant's wife, Sylvia Crawford.90 Sylvia Crawford's statement was
made while she was a suspect/witness undergoing stationhouse custodial
interrogation and after she had been given Miranda warnings.91 At trial,
Sylvia Crawford invoked the state marital privilege and did not testify;
her statement was admitted under the hearsay exception for statements
against interest.92
Justice Scalia, who wrote for a unanimous Crawford Court,
emphasized that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to
confrontation to all criminal defendants; yet for decades judges had
routinely substituted their own ad hoc determinations of evidentiary
reliability for the "crucible of cross-examination."93 This practice bore
the full brunt of Justice Scalia's estimable ire. According to the
Crawford Court, "[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is
obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a
defendant is obviously guilty."94 Thus, for the first time in decades, the
Court ignored the rules of evidence and focused instead on the text and
history of the Sixth Amendment.95
88. David A. Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REv. 1634, 1636 (2009).
89. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40 (2004).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 61.
94. Id. at 62 ("The unpardonable vice of the Roberts test, however, is not its unpredictability,
but its demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause
plainly meant to exclude.").
95. Id. at 63.
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For its textualist analysis, Crawford borrowed heavily from Justice
Thomas's concurring opinion in White, but with significant exceptions.
In White, Justice Thomas had opined that "the critical phrase within the
[Confrontation] Clause.... is 'witnesses against him.' . . . [Thus a]ny
attempt at unraveling and understanding the relationship between the
Clause and the hearsay rules must begin with an analysis of the meaning
of that phrase."
Justice Scalia began his opinion for the Crawford Court with a
similar approach that initially seemed designed to resolve the question of
who serves as a "witness[] against" the accused. The Court sought
clarification on the relevant terminology from an 1828 edition of
Webster's American Dictionary of the English Language which defined
a "'witness[]' against the accused" as one who "'bear[s] testimony"' and
defined "'testimony"' as "'a solemn declaration or affirmation made for
the purpose of establishing or proving some fact."' 98 According to the
Crawford Court, the Framers' reference to "witness" in the
Confrontation Clause was not narrowly limited to witnesses who testify
in court.99 Nor could it properly be read as broad enough to encompass
all out-of-court declarants. Instead, according to Justice Scalia,
"witnesses" should be understood to include those who testify in
courtrooms or by affidavit and those who bear testimony outside the
courthouse by making "testimonial statements."'0 Four years later, this
shift in focus-away from the witness and towards the statement-
would be criticized by the Melendez-Diaz dissenters. In their view, it is
a "fundamental mistake ... to read the Confrontation Clause as referring
to a kind of out-of-court statement-namely a testimonial statement-
that must be excluded from evidence."' 0'
Justice Scalia also examined the history of the Confrontation
Clause. Following a lengthy disquisition of the treason trial of Sir
Walter Raleigh along with other historical materials, the Court held that
"the principal evil at which the confrontation clause was directed was
the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex
parte communications as evidence against the accused."'0 2 Thus, the
right to confrontation should be viewed as independent from the rules of
96. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 359 (1992).
97. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38.
98. Id. at 51 (quoting 2 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1828)).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2550 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
102. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
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evidence because "the Framers would not have allowed the admission of
testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he
was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity
for cross-examination."103 As Professor Robert Mosteller would observe
shortly after Crawford was decided, "[t]he opinion in Crawford provides
the Court's (Justice Scalia's) view of the historical purpose of the
Confrontation Clause[] [and tjhese historical materials and the
perspective adopted are obviously selective, but they are now the
essential materials and the privileged perspective."
After Crawford, federal and state criminal courts could no longer
base their confrontation decisions on an assessment of evidentiary
trustworthiness. Instead, judges would need new tools to distinguish
"testimonial statements" from the infinite range of out-of-court
statements from unavailable crime victims and witnesses that would
inevitably be proffered by future state and federal prosecutors.
B. The Advent of the "Testimonial Statement"
Crawford replaced the Ohio v. Roberts reliability/evidence-based
rule with the constitutional standard that the Confrontation Clause
applies to all prosecution-sponsored "testimonial statements." The act of
identifying which statements qualify as testimonial would now be of
great constitutional and practical import. Twelve years earlier, Justice
Scalia had shared Justice Thomas's view that "the Confrontation Clause
is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such affidavits,
depositions, prior testimony or confessions."' 05 Formality was no longer
determinative to Justice Scalia who was content to "leave for another
day" 06 any definition of testimonial statements beyond the observation
that, "[w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former
trial; and to police interrogations."'
07
Crawford also contained dicta that (rather confusingly) identified,
but did not endorse, three different alternative definitions of testimonial
statements. The narrowest of the three definitions echoed Justice
103. Id. at 53-54 (emphasis added).
104. Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the
Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 514 (2005).
105. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (emphasis
added).
106. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
107. Id.
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Thomas's view that confrontation should be limited to statements
"'contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits,
custodial examinations, prior testimony, or confessions.", 08 The second
and third definitions left more room for interpretation. The second
definition (which had been offered by the Crawford petitioner) expanded
"testimonial statements" to the functional equivalent of ex parte in-court
testimony such as "'affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony
that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial
statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially. . . ."'09 The third definition (which had been suggested
in an amicus brief filed by the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers) defined as testimonial all statements "'made under
circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.""' 0
The Crawford Court enumerated various types of "formalized
testimonial materials" that invariably qualified as "testimonial
statements" (i.e., prior testimony, depositions, and affidavits)."' Oddly,
Justice Scalia's list also included confessions, although clearly not all
confessions are testimonial statements. In fact, the Crawford Court
qualified its own reference to post-interrogation confessions noting that
"we use 'interrogation' in its colloquial . . . sense" and because "one can
imagine various definitions of 'interrogation' the Court need not select
among them in this case [because] Sylvia's recorded statement,
knowingly given in response to structured police questioning qualifies
under any conceivable definition."ll 2  Here, the Court's emphasis on
"structured police questioning" and a "recorded statement" suggests
consonance with previous emphasis on the formality of the interrogation
and resulting confession." 3 However, as the Court would soon clarify,
the third, broadest, and most ambiguous conceptualization of
"testimonial statements" would soon become the new confrontation
standard.
108. Id. at 52 (quoting White, 502 U.S. at 365).
109. Id. at 51 (quoting Brief of the Petitioner at 23, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004) (No. 02-9410)).
110. Id. at 52 (quoting Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as
Amici Curiae at 3, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410)).
111. Id. at 51-52.
112. Idat53n.4.
113. White, 502 U.S. at 365 (including "extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized
testimonial materials, such affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions").
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C. Davis v. Washington: The Ongoing Emergency and Primary
Purpose Criteria
Davis v. Washington and its consolidated companion case Hammon
v. Indiana were two domestic violence cases decided by the Court in
2006.114 In an opinion that closely tracks the facts of the two cases; the
Davis Court found that statements made by an alleged victim to a police
911 operator during a domestic emergency were non-testimonial
because they were made "under circumstances objectively indicating
that the primary purpose of interrogation is to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency."" 5 In contrast, a written and sworn battery
affidavit prepared under the direction of the police following a secured-
scene police interview were testimonial because they were made "when
the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecutions."' 1 6
The Davis Court also found that "formality is indeed essential to
testimonial utterance""' 7 and reiterated the Crawford Court's conclusion
that "' [a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark does
not."" 8  To emphasize this distinction, Justice Scalia compared Sylvia
Crawford's post-Miranda stationhouse custodial interrogation to
Michelle McCottry's mid-assault 911 call noting that "the difference in
the level of formality [between the two interrogations] is striking."" 9
According to the Davis Court, Sylvia Crawford "was responding calmly,
at the station house, to a series of questions, with the officer interrogator
114. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, (2006); Hammon v. Indiana, 546 U.S. 976 (2005).
115. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 830 n.5.
118. Id. at 824 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)). This conclusion is
not undermined by the majority's unpersuasive assertion that if the interrogation was "solely
directed at establishing the facts of a past crime, in order to identify (or provide evidence to convict
the perpetrator)" the resulting victim/witness statement will be akin to a '"solemn declaration or
affirmation."' Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51).
This dicta ignores the Court's own detailed effort to distinguish Michelle McCottry's informal 911
call where "she was not acting as a witness" from Sylvia Crawford's formal stationhouse interview.
Id. at 828 (emphasis in original). It is also effectively refuted by Justice Thomas, who argued that
"[t]he possibility that an oral declaration of past fact to a police officer, if false, could result in legal
consequences to the speaker may render honesty in casual conversations with police officers
important. It does not, however, render those conversations solemn or formal in the ordinary
meanings of those terms." Id at 838 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
119. Id.at814.
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taping and making notes of her answers" 120 while Michelle McCottry
provided "frantic answers ... over the phone, in an environment that
was not tranquil, or even (as far as any reasonable 911 operator could
make out) safe."' 2' Thus, as a constitutional matter Michelle McCottry
"was not acting as a witness; she was not testifying . .. [and w]hat she
said was not 'a weaker substitute for live testimony' at trial."l22
Unlike Crawford, which had involved a suspect's/witness's
structured and recorded post-Miranda stationhouse custodial
interrogation, the Davis statements were taken from victims at the crime
scene during or shortly after crimes of violence. Thus, Davis provided
the Court with the opportunity to elaborate on the defining
characteristics of a testimonial statement taken under common, if more
complex, circumstances. However, Justice Scalia opted to forgo this
opportunity with the (implausible) excuse that the Court cannot be
expected to create "an exhaustive classification of all conceivable
statements-or even all conceivable statements in response to police
interrogation-as either a testimonial or non-testimonial ....
D. Giles v. California: Forfeiture of the Right to Confrontation by
Wrongdoing
In 2006, in Giles v. Calfornia,124 the Supreme Court addressed the
related question of forfeiture of confrontation by wrongdoing. During
defendant's murder trial, the prosecutor had introduced statements made
by the victim (defendant's former girlfriend) to the police during a
domestic violence incident three weeks before the alleged murder.125 On
appeal, defendant argued that admission of the victim's statements
violated his right to confrontation under Crawford. The California
Court of Appeals and the California Supreme Court both held that the
defendant had forfeited his right to confront the victim by killing her.12 6
When Giles reached the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia, once again
writing for the majority, disagreed. According to the Giles Court, a
defendant does not forfeit his right to confrontation by his own
wrongdoing unless the prosecution can establish that the defendant
120. Id. at 827.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 828 (quoting United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986)).
123. Id. at 822.
124. 554 U.S. 353 (2008).
125. Id. at 356-57.
126. See People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 850 (2004); People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 435
(Cal. 2007).
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intended through his actions to prevent the witness from testifying. 27
Any other intent will not suffice because, under the common law "the
'wrong' and 'evil Practices' to which . .. statements [defining forfeiture]
referred was conduct designed to prevent a witness from testifying."1 2 8
Although the Giles Court acknowledged that "the absence of a forfeiture
rule covering this sort of conduct would create an intolerable incentive
for defendants to bribe, intimidate, or even kill witnesses against
them," 29 it could not accept the "notion that judges may strip the
defendant of a right that the Constitution deems essential to a fair trial,
on the basis of a priorjudicial assessment that the defendant is guilty as
charged .... [because that would be] akin ... to 'dispensing with jury
trial because a defendant is obviously guilty." 30
Although Giles was focused on forfeiture, two members of the
Court seized the opportunity to articulate their growing concerns about
the trajectory of the confrontation doctrine. Justice Thomas's concurring
opinion reiterated his long-standing view "that statements like those
made by the victim in this case do not implicate the Confrontation
Clause" because "the police questioning was not 'a formalized dialogue'
... because 'the statements were neither Mirandized nor custodial, nor
accompanied by any similar indicia of formality . . . .""' Similar
concerns were expressed, for the first time, by Justice Alito who wrote a
separate concurrence
to make clear that, like Justice Thomas, I am not convinced that
the out-of-court statement at issue here fell within the
Confrontation Clause in the first place . . . . [because] the
Confrontation Clause does not apply to out-of-court statements
unless it can be said that the are the equivalent of statements
made at trial by 'witnesses.'l3
E. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts: Expert Witnesses and
Testimonial Statements
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts arose out of a Boston police
investigation that resulted in the arrest of Luis Melendez-Diaz and the
discovery of nineteen bags of white powder hidden in the back seat of a
127. Giles, 554 U.S. at 367-68; see FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
128. Giles, 554 U.S. at 365 (emphasis in original).
129. Id.
130. Id. (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004)).
131. Id at 377-78 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 840 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)).
132. Id. at 378 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
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police patrol car. 33 The defendant was charged with distributing and
trafficking in cocaine. 134 At his trial, the Commonwealth submitted three
"'certificates of analysis."' 135 These certificates reported the amount of
white powder seized from the defendant and detailed how the powder
had been "examined with the following results: The substance was
found to contain: Cocaine." 3 As required by state law, the three
certificates had been sworn to before a notary public.137  The
Massachusetts statutory design was clear. Sworn and notarized
certificates of analysis were intended to promote accurate crime
laboratory analyses and to provide prima facie evidence of the
composition, quality, and weight of the tested substance.'38 Thus, when
certificates of analysis were offered at trial, prosecutors for the
Commonwealth could, but need not, call the analyst to testify.
At trial, the defendant objected to admission of the certificates as a
violation of his confrontation rights as construed by the Supreme Court
in Crawford.'3 9 The defendant's request was denied by the trial court
and the decision to admit the certificates was affirmed by the
Massachusetts Appellate Court.14 0 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve open questions about the impact of
Crawford on defendant's opportunity to cross-examine prosecutor's
expert witnesses.
In his June 2009 opinion for the Court in Melendez-Diaz, Justice
Scalia wrote for an eclectic plurality that included Justices Stevens,
Souter and Ginsburg. In the first few pages of the plurality opinion,
Justice Scalia concluded that the lab certificates were testimonial
statements because: (1) they were affidavits; (2) they were "'made
under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably
to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later
trial;"'l 4 1 and (3) because "we can safely assume that the analysts were
aware of the affidavits' evidentiary purpose .. " 4 The first rationale
133. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2530 (2009).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2531.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2532 (the "purpose of the affidavits was to provide 'prima facie evidence of the
composition, quality, and the net weight' of the analyzed substance") (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS,
ch. 111, § 13).
139. Id at 2531.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2531 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004)).
142. Id. at 2532.
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provides the only point of agreement with Justice Thomas whose
concurrence was the essential fifth vote.143
Justice Kennedy, who wrote for the four Melendez-Diaz dissenters
(Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Breyer), argued that
"witnesses against the accused" are limited to conventional/adversarial
prosecution witnesses and cannot be extended to experts who have
"witnessed nothing to give them personal knowledge of the defendant's
guilt."'" The length and tone of the dissent suggests that four members
of the current Court have profound analytic and practical concerns about
the Court's post-Crawford trajectory. In their view, this unwarranted
expansion of the right to confront will "disrupt forensic investigations
across the country and put prosecutions nationwide at risk of dismissal
based on erratic, all-too-frequent instances when a particular laboratory
technician, now invested by the Court's new constitutional designation
as the analyst, simply does not or cannot appear."145
On September 29, 2010, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Bullcoming v. New Mexico'" to address a question left open
by Melendez-Diaz. In Bullcoming, the Court will decide whether trial
testimony from a "surrogate" expert witness who did not prepare the
defendant's certified blood alcohol report, but worked in the same lab
and relied on the report for his own opinions, satisfied the Confrontation
Clause.14 7 Bullcoming will likely revive the Melendez-Diaz question of
the nature and extent of expert witness confrontation.
IV. THE CURRENT CONFRONTATION STANDARD: THE PREcAIUS
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF MICHIGAN V. BRYANT
A. Facts and Legal History
On the night of April 29, 2001, five Detroit police officers
responded to a report of a shooting and found Anthony Covington lying
on the ground next to his car in a gas station driveway.148 The police
143. Id. at 2543.
144. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that the plurality "makes no attempt to acknowledge
the real differences between laboratory analysts who perform scientific tests and other, more
conventional witnesses-'witnesses' being the word the Framers used in the Confrontation
Clause").
145. Id. at 2549 (Kennedy, J. dissenting).
146. 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010).
147. Id.
148. Brief for Respondent at 1, Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (No. 09-150), 2010
WL 2481866.
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officers could see that Covington had been shot and could see blood on
the front of his shirt.149 The officers asked about his wound and assured
him that an EMS unit had been dispatched.'" When they asked him,
"What happened?" he responded, "I've been shot.""' The officers asked
Covington who shot him, and he told them it was Rick.152  Covington
also told them that Rick has shot him through the door of a nearby house
and that after he was shot he had driven himself a few blocks to the gas
station.153 EMS arrived and transported Covington to the hospital where
he died from his wounds several hours later.154
Richard Perry Bryant was arrested in March 2002.55 At Bryant's
homicide trial, Covington's statements were admitted as excited
utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule. 56  Although the victim's
statements were also arguably dying declarations, the prosecutor failed
to raise this argument at trial. Bryant was convicted of second degree
murder and possession of a firearm.5 7
On direct appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals, the defendant's
conviction was affirmed.s The appellate court found that the admission
of Covington's statement did not violate the Confrontation Clause
because they were not testimonial statements under Crawford.'"9 After
Davis was decided in 2006, the United States Supreme Court remanded
the case to the state court of appeals.160 However, Davis apparently had
no impact, because the appellate court again concluded that Covington's
statements were non-testimonial because they had been made "in the
course of a police interrogation under circumstances objectively
indicating that its primary purpose was to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency."' 6'
On June 10, 2009, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeals.162 Using the same constitutional standard which they defined
149. Id. at 2.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.at1.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2.
155. Id at 6.
156. Id. at 3.
157. Id. at 6.
158. Id.
159. People v. Bryant, No. 247039, 2004 WL 188266 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2004) (per
curiam).
160. People v. Bryant, 756 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. 2008).
161. People v. Bryant, No. 247039, 2007 WL 675471, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2007).
162. People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65 (Mich. 2009).
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as "whether the victim's statements were made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary
purpose of the interrogation was to enable police to meet an 'ongoing
emergency,"' 163 the state supreme court reached the opposite
conclusion.1M
The three dissenting Michigan Supreme Court judges strongly
disagreed that the facts revealed that Covington's primary investigatory
purpose was to provide information "to enable the police to identify,
locate, and apprehend the perpetrator.,,6 In a very brief dissent, Judge
Weaver explained that the evidence suggested that "the declarant's
statements were made in the course of a police interrogation under
circumstances objectively indicating that the interrogation's primary
purpose was to enable police assistance in an ongoing emergency." 6 6
Judge Corrigan, who was joined in his dissent by Judge Young, agreed
with Judge Weaver, adding that Covington's evidentiary intent was
clearly to resolve an emergency created by a shooting by an
unapprehended suspect.16 7 Because most mid-investigation statements
from crime victims/witnesses occur after the crime has occurred, the
dissenters accused the majority of "assum[ing] too much when it
concludes that there was no ongoing emergency because the shooting
necessarily occurred 30 minutes earlier."168
The state court history of Bryant effectively demonstrates that
judges asked to divine whether the primary purpose of an interrogation
was to: (1) help the police resolve an emergency; or (2) to provide
evidence for later use, can reach inconsistent and contradictory
conclusions. In many cases both purposes are plausible, either purpose
can be supported by the facts, and the two purposes are neither mutually
exclusive nor logically inconsistent. It did not help, that throughout the
state court appellate process, the judges consistently failed to clarify
whose primary purpose should control the analysis or to address the
inevitable complications of ambiguous, shifting, or conflicting
purposes.16 9
163. Id. at 70 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)).
164. Id. at 71.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 79 (Weaver, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 80 (Corrigan, J., dissenting).
168. Id.
169. Professor Richard D. Friedman has consistently argued that the perspective must be that
of the reasonable declarant. See, e.g., Brief of Richard D. Friedman, as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Respondent, supra note 30, at 7.
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B. Bryant and the Objective Primary Purpose of the Investigation
Standard
1. The Parties Begin with a Similar Approach
In briefs filed with the United States Supreme Court in April 2010,
the state of Michigan (petitioner) argued that, after Davis and under the
Confrontation Clause, "[s]tatements are non-testimonial when made in
the course of police investigations under circumstances objectively
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency."l 70 Bryant's counsel
(respondent) similarly suggested that the victim's "out-of-court
statements . . . met the Crawford and Davis tests for testimonial
statements, as they were made with a primary purpose of providing
evidence relevant to past criminal behavior."171  The only distinction
between the two arguments was that the respondent urged the Court to
focus on the reasonable declarant's primary purpose, while the petitioner
advanced a more ambiguous "purpose of the investigation" standard.
2. Petitioner's Early Attempt to Integrate Formality Concerns
The Bryant petitioner's argument focused almost exclusively on the
question of whether "an interrogation's primary purpose is to help police
handle an ongoing emergency. .. " However, petitioner also urged
the Court to consider its own Davis conclusion that "testimonial
statements" under the Confrontation Clause must "necessarily include
some sense of formality or solemnity . . . ."' Although, neither
petitioner's brief nor petitioner's oral argument mentioned Justice
Thomas's concurrence in White, petitioner reminded the Court that
Crawford had defined "'testimony' to typically include 'a solemn
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or
proving some fact.', 1 74 A more detailed and persuasive argument for
formality as a critical criterion of confrontation was advanced by (then)
Solicitor General Elena Kagan as amicus for petitioner.175
170. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 8, Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (No. 09-
150), 2010 WL 1776430 (emphasis added).
171. Brief for Respondent, supra note 148, at 26 (emphasis added).
172. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, supra note 170, at 8.
173. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, supra note 170, at 6.
174. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, supra note 170, at 7 (quoting Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)).
175. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13, Michigan v.
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (No. 09-150), 2010 WL 1848212. Of course, it is relevant that
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3. Elaboration on the Formality Argument from Petitioner's
Amicus
Solicitor General Kagan actually made two related arguments.
First, after Crawford, "testimonial" applies only "to those modern
practices most closely related to the historical use of ex parte
examinations as evidence against the accused."' 76  As the Crawford
Court had explained, attention to the formality of the making of the
statement makes sense because the Confrontation Clause is "especially
acute[ly] concerned" with "'[a]n accuser who make a formal statement
to government officers [and thus] bears testimony . . . .'""' This
argument, which was adopted by the Bryant Court,78 effectively linked
formality to consideration of the more textually precise and historically
accurate question of whether the declarant had acted as a "witness[]
against the accused." The Solicitor General's second argument was a
practical elaboration on how judges might make the determination of
whether a victim/witness made a formal statement equivalent to trial
testimony including: (1) whether "[t]he police officers had . . . control
over the location of the interview;"' 79 (2) whether the police controlled
the duration of the interview or "had only a few minutes to ask questions
before the paramedics arrived;" 180 and (3) whether the police had the
"opportunity to structure their questions, . . . [or to] attempt to shape ...
[the victim's] testimony for use in a future criminal trial."' 81 According
to Solicitor General Kagan, this inquiry would facilitate adherence to the
Court's post-Crawford doctrinal focus on 'modem practices with the
closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was
directed."'l 82
4. Respondent Addresses the Formality Argument
The Bryant respondent also (accurately) anticipated that the Court
would include formality as a component of its confrontation analysis;
but hoped to prevent this from happening by persuading the Court that
Elena Kagan is now a member of the Court, despite the fact that one cannot assume that, in her new
role Justice Kagan will maintain these same views.
176. Id. at 8.
177. Id. at 11 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51).
178. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
179. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 175, at 17.
180. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 175, at 17.
181. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 175, at 17.
182. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 175, at 11
(quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68).
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all statements to the police are formal. To support this argument,
respondent asserted that "[t]his court held in Davis that statements made
to investigating police officers are sufficiently solemn and formal for the
purposes of the Confrontation Clause because witnesses should be aware
that giving a false statement to the police is itself criminal." 8  Even
Justice Scalia, who so dislikes formality as a criterion of confrontation
analysis that he remarked during Bryant oral argument, "[fjorget about
formality, in other words . . . Formality or no formality has nothing to do
with it,"'" should find this assertion implausible. In fact, it has already
been persuasively refuted by Justice Thomas, who argued in Davis that a
declarant's knowledge that a false statement to the police "could result
in legal consequences to the speaker, . . . may render honesty in casual
conversations with police officers important. It does not, however,
render those conversations solemn or formal in the ordinary meanings of
those terms."'85
5. Elaboration on the Formality Argument from Respondent's
Amicus
Respondent's amicus also anticipated the Court's interest in
testimonial formality. The National Association of Defense Lawyers
("NACDL") argued (without support) that formality should have no
independent role in the Court's confrontation analysis. Thus, the Court
should simply adopt the "general principle that statements should not be
exempted for lack of formality where evidentiary purpose is otherwise
shown." 86 In the alternative, NACDL argued that all testimonial
statements are formal because they have the capacity to engender a
formal result by "provid[ing] a basis for official action, the arrest of the
suspected offender."' 87
Professor Richard D. Friedman, a leading authority on
confrontation jurisprudence whose work and advocacy before the Court
has helped shape recent developments in the field, filed an amicus brief
in favor of respondent. Professor Friedman argued that the Court should
not consider any facts and circumstances relating to formality of the act
183. Brief for Respondent, supra note 148, at 21-22 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S.
813, 826-27 (2006)).
184. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 4.
185. Davis, 547 U.S. at 838 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
186. Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 14, Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (No. 09-150), 2010 WL
2569158.
187. Id. at 16.
201l] FINDING NINO 1239
AKRON LAW REVIEW
of serving as a witness because "it would stand logic on its head to treat
a statement as non-testimonial, even though it was made in anticipation
of prosecutorial use, on the ground that it was made informally. . . .
[because t]he very point of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure that
testimony is given under required formalities."8 This argument
deserves some attention.
It is inarguable that informal mid-investigation statements to the
police can do just as much inculpatory damage as formal statements.
There are also many compelling reasons to prefer a more expansive
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause including a desire for fair
trials, concerns about leveling the playing field, or disappointment with
judges' ability to accurately or consistently operate the relevant
standards and rules; but Professor Friedman is making a different point.
He has argued that because the Confrontation Clause guarantees certain
trial formalities (cross-examination), it is illogical to limit "witnesses
against the accused" to the subset of out-of-court declarants who qualify
as "witnesses" because they have made out-of-court statements under
more formal circumstances (in affidavits or during structured police
interrogation).'89 The logic of Professor Friedman's argument depends
on a false conflation of the two "formalities." The guaranteed "trial
formality" of live witness cross-examination ("the very point of the
Confrontation Clause") serves a range of vital defense interests. In
contrast, a "definitional formality" that sets forth factors that distinguish
witnessing from talking would serve the entirely different goal of
limiting the potentially infinite range of out-of-court declarants to those
who must be subject to confrontation.
Finally, Professor Friedman rejected possible pragmatic concerns
arguing that a primary investigatory purpose standard is analogous to the
constitutional standards routinely used by judges to determine custody
(under Miranda) or reasonable expectations of privacy and reasonable
stops and seizures (under the Fourth Amendment).'90
This second argument is not compelling. These other constitutional
inquiries are not analogous because (unlike the objective primary
purpose of the interrogation) they each involve a binary choice between
mutually exclusive alternatives. A suspect either believes she is in
188. Brief of Richard D. Friedman, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, supra note 30,
at 16.
189. Brief of Richard D. Friedman, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, supra note 30,
at 16.
190. See Brief of Richard D. Friedman, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, supra
note 30, at 11.
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custody, or believes she is not in custody. A person either has a
reasonable expectation of privacy, or she does not. The fundamental
problem with a confrontation standard that requires judges to determine
the primary purpose of the reasonable victim/witness and police officer
mid-investigation is that in many cases it will be logical and consistent
for the victim/witness and the police officer to believe that a statement
could help to resolve an ongoing emergency now and later prove useful
at trial.
V. THE POST-SCALIA FUTURE OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
A. Insight from the Bryant Oral Arguments
1. Nailing Down the Objective Primary Purpose of the
Interrogation
On October 5, 2010, the Court heard oral argument in Bryant. It
was clear from the start that the objective primary purpose of the
interrogation standard is difficult, if not impossible, to operate. As an
initial matter, the Justices thoroughly disagreed about whose primary
purpose should control. Justice Scalia supported respondent's argument
that "it's the purpose of the declarant, not of the questioner." 9 ' In
contrast, the Chief Justice opined that "the focus seems to be on the
purpose of the interrogation, which seems to be the question of what the
police thought, not what the-the person dying thought." 92
Justice Ginsburg added to the confusion by contributing her
realistic concern regarding dual purposes (to resolve an emergency and
to provide evidence) which might coexist not only in the same person,
but even in the same question or statement. According to Justice
Ginsburg, "it seems to me, here, if you want to know what happened,
you would ask the very same questions. . . . [because] the questions are
relevant also to securing the situation. . . . [so] what different questions
would you ask if you wanted to find out what happened?"' 93 Justice
Alito echoed Justice Ginsburg's concern questioning both the logic and
operability of the proposed primary purpose standard:
In a situation like this, do you think it's meaningful to ask
what the primary purpose of the victim was when he responded
to the police and said who shot him?
191. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 6.
192. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 11.
193. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 5.
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You have a man who has just been shot. He has a wound
that's going to turn out to be fatal, and he's lying there on the
ground bleeding profusely, and he says: My primary purpose in
saying this is so that they can respond to an ongoing emergency?
No, but I also have the purpose of giving them information that
could be used at trial, but it's a little less-that's a little bit less
my purpose than responding to the ongoing emergency. 194
Finally, the Court considered the important question of whether the
primary purpose of the interrogation must be evident from the statement
itself or could be inferred from the relevant facts. On this point, Chief
Justice Roberts disagreed with respondent's counsel's assertion that the
ongoing emergency must be clear from the statement. Using a school
shooting hypothetical, the Chief Justice posited that if the witness said
"the principal did it. It's 10:00 in the morning, you assume the principal
is at the school and he says the principal did it. You can infer from the
circumstances that he's referring to an ongoing emergency."'"
2. Reconsidering Evidentiary Reliability
Some members of the Court used the Bryant oral argument to raise
dormant questions about evidentiary reliability. This line of inquiry
began with a nod to Crawford as Justice Kennedy noted that "Crawford
rejects reliability as a criteria [sic]"' 96 and was followed by Justice
Scalia's more precise observation that "there is no basis for saying ...
the Confrontation Clause pertains only to reliability."' 97  However,
Justice Sotomayor wondered whether the assumption that a police
interrogation had been aimed at risk assessment means "we're back to
the reliability test, really, . . . [because i]t goes to the very essence of
reliability."'9 8  Later on Justice Kennedy seemed to share Justice
Sotomayor's concern when he commented that if "there was an
emergency and the police were asking questions in order to mitigate the
emergency,"' 99 under these circumstances the "police likely have less
motive to manipulate the-the statements and to ask loaded questions[.]
That in itself, it seems to me, is . . . reliabil[ity]."200 Towards the end of
the oral argument, after a series of questions to respondent's counsel
194. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 7-8.
195. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 57.
196. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 15.
197. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 42 (emphasis added).
198. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 15.
199. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 26.
200. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 27.
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regarding the type of questions police ask to resolve ongoing
emergencies, Justice Kennedy concluded: "Isn't there a reliability
component that underlies this whether we like it or not?" 201
3. Are all Statements about Past Events Testimonial?
The most significant and comical disagreements arose when the
justices attempted to draw lines between testimonial and non-testimonial
statements based on whether the statements related to past events.
Justice Scalia began with the preposterous assertion that during ongoing
emergencies people simply do not ask or speak about past events.
According to Justice Scalia, "if it was an emergency, he [the police
officer] wouldn't have asked, What happened? He would ask, What is
happening? [Because t]o ask what happened is to ask the declarant to
describe past events, which is testimonial."202 Justice Alito was clearly
not convinced and he sought clarification from respondent asking: "Is-
can there be an ongoing emergency where the statement relates-where
the statement recounts something that has occurred, not something that
is occurring?" 203 Respondent replied that "if the witness only gives a
statement that relates to past, completed events, then it's not a showing
of-of an ongoing emergency." 204 At this point, the Chief Justice
intervened to remind everyone that, of course, a statement could relate
"something that happened in the past, he shot me, . . . [and] at the same
time demonstrate[] an ongoing emergency because he's right there and
he might shoot you."205
4. Operating the Objective Primary Purpose of the Investigation
Standard
Justice Thomas, as is his wont, did not participate in the Bryant oral
argument. However, the spectacle of his colleagues' confusion
confirmed the accuracy of his five-year-old Davis prediction that
[i]n many, if not most, cases where police respond to a report of
a crime, whether pursuant to a 911 call from the victim or
otherwise, the purposes of an interrogation, viewed from the
perspective of the police, are both to respond to the emergency
situation and to gather evidence. Assigning one of these two
201. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 38.
202. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 13.
203. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 44.
204. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 44.
205. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 45.
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"largely unverifiable motives," primacy requires constructing a
hierarchy of purpose that will rarely be present-and is not
reliably discernible. It will inevitably be, quite simply, an
exercise in fiction.206
These increasingly obvious operational problems may have
precipitated Justice Breyer's concern that the Court had gone too far.
During oral argument, Justice Breyer (who had joined both the Crawford
and Davis majorities) now sought a principled way to distinguish the
following scenarios:
[p]eople going into a room and saying, "now write out your
testimony," and they write it out in the form of an affidavit, or
they send in a letter, and they say "bye," and then they walk next
door to the trial and introduce it. I mean, that's Walter Raleigh,
in my mind.
And on the other side of the line, is an evidentiary rules [sic] that
are basically in State cases run by the State. And they
sometimes let hearsay in, and they sometimes don't, and they
make reliability et cetera judgments in developing their-their
decision as to how hearsay exceptions will work.
In Justice Breyer's view, if statements like Anthony Covington's
required confrontation, the Court would be endowing the Confrontation
Clause with the power to swallow a range of federal and state
"exceptions to hearsay testimony, which have been well-established in
the United States for 200 years."208
B. Insight from the Court's Decision in Bryant
Although Justice Scalia called Bryant "an absurdly easy case,"209
the confused oral argument presaged an opinion that, as discussed above,
ricochets among a range of possible confrontation criteria including:
1. "[T]he statements and actions of both the declarant and
interrogators."210
2. Whether the ongoing emergency posed a threat to the public
at 211at large.21
206. Davis v, Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 839 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
207. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 47-48.
208. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 26, at 50.
209. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1170 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
210. Id.atll48.
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3. The "informality in an encounter between a victim and
police."212
4. "The parties' perception that an emergency is ongoing." 2 13
5. Whether "the cause of the shooting was a purely private
dispute."2 14
6. Whether the assailant used a gun.215
7. Whether, at the time of the interrogation, the police knew the
location of the assailant. 216
8. Whether the police asked the "type of questions necessary to
allow the police to 'assess the situation, the threat to their own
safety, and possible danger to the potential victim' and to the
public ....
Justice Sotomayor makes little effort to prioritize these factors or to
explain to the lower courts how conflicts should be resolved. To cite
just a few likely areas of ongoing confusion: (1) Should the parties' (or
even the reasonable parties') perception of an ongoing emergency
control, if the facts indicate that the emergency has been resolved?; (2)
What factors should courts use to determine the formality of a mid-
investigation encounter between the police and a victim/witness?; (3)
Does the use of a gun always create a non-private dispute and/or a threat
to the public at large?; or (4) If the police do not know the location of the
suspect, when is the emergency no longer ongoing?
In fact, the threshold question of whose objective primary purpose
controls, which was front and center in both the Bryant briefs and oral
argument, has not even been resolved. In his dissent, Justice Scalia
posited that "[t]he declarant's intent is what counts." 218 However, in her
decision for the majority, Justice Sotomayor concluded that "Davis
requires a combined inquiry that accounts for both the declarant and the
interrogator."2 19 In the view of the Bryant majority, a "combined
inquiry" will "ameliorate[] problems that could arise from looking solely
211. Id.at 1156.
212. Id. at 1160 (emphasis in original).
213. Id. at 1162 (emphasis added).
214. Id. at 1163.
215. Id.at 1164.
216. Id. at 1163.
217. Id. at 1166 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832 (2006)).
218. Id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 1160.
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to one participant." 220 This is unlikely given the inevitable complexities
of real life crime scenes along with the increase in shifting, dual, and
conflicting purposes among victims, witnesses, and police officers. As
Justice Scalia observed, "[s]orting out the primary purpose of a declarant
with mixed motives is sometimes difficult. But adding in the mixed
motives of the police only compounds the problem."221
It is worth noting that Bryant's dual purpose standard is not
supported by the relevant case law. In fact, Justice Sotomayor
specifically rejected clear language from Davis identifying "'the
declarant's statements, not the interrogator's questions [as the statement]
that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate."' 222 According to
the Bryant majority, the Davis Court did not mean (what it said) that the
primary purpose of the victim/witness should control, but was instead
"merely acknowledg[ing] that the Confrontation Clause is not implicated
when statements are offered 'for purposes other than establishing the
truth of the matter asserted."'
2 23
Justice Sotomayor's interpretation ignores the fact that the quoted
language from Davis appears, not within a discussion of hearsay as she
has implied, but as support and elaboration for the Court's holding that
statements "are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate
that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of
the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant
to later criminal prosecution." 224 Even more problematic is the Bryant
majority's selective omission of relevant introductory language. When
the sentence is quoted in full, it becomes obvious that the Davis Court
was not discussing hearsay, but was instead explaining that "[a]nd of
course even when interrogation exists, it is in the final analysis the
declarant's statement, not the interrogator's questions that the
220. Id. at 1161.
221. Id. at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting). On this point, Justice Scalia argues with undeniable
logic that:
The Court claims one affirmative virtue for its focus on the purposes of both the
declarant and the police: It "ameliorates problems that ... arise" when declarants have
"mixed motives." I am at a loss to know how.... Now courts will have to sort through
two sets of mixed motives to determine the primary purpose of an interrogation. And the
Court's solution creates a mixed-motive problem where (under the proper theory) it does
not exist-viz., where the police and the declarant each have one motive, but those
motives conflict. The Court does not provide an answer to this glaringly obvious
problem, probably because it does not have one.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
222. Id. at 1161 n.1l (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822-23 & n.l (2006)).
223. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,59 n.9 (2004)).
224. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
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Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate." 225 The Davis Court
clearly intended that the declarant's statement and her intent when she
made the statement provide the focus for the analysis.
Finally, the Bryant Court further obfuscates the confrontation
inquiry by reviving reliability concerns in two ways. First, the Court
reads into Davis the "implicit . . . idea that because the process of
fabrication in statements given for the primary purpose of resolving an
ongoing emergency is presumably significantly diminished, the
Confrontation Clause does not require such statements to be subject to
the crucible of cross-examination." 22 6  Thus, for the first time since
Crawford, the Court has suggested that confrontation is not required, in
part, because there was no time for a reasonable victim/witness to
fabricate her statement. Second, the Court finds that "some out-of-court
statements-where the objective primary purpose of the investigation
was not to resolve an ongoing emergency-do not raise confrontation
concerns"227 and that for these statements, when "making the primary
purpose determination, standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify
some statements as reliable, will be relevant."228 Unless the majority is
making a vague reference to all non-testimonial statements, this dictum
suggests an undefined class of mid-investigation out-of-court
victim/witness statements not made to resolve a Davis/Bryant "ongoing
emergency," but not subject to confrontation.
C. Toward a New Confrontation Jurisprudence
It is clear that numerous important confrontation questions have not
been resolved. With Justice Scalia's leadership waning, the Chief
Justice and Justices Kennedy, Breyer and Alito are likely to gain traction
to reframe the confrontation inquiry in the near future. Their Melendez-
Diaz dissent lays the foundation for a revised approach focused on the
question of whether the out-of-court declarant was a "witness[] against
the accused." 229 To the extent that this determination includes greater
consideration of the formality of the circumstances of "witnessing,"
these Justices will gain purchase with Justice Thomas.
225. Id. at 822 n.1 (emphasis added).
226. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157.
227. Id. at 1155 ("But there may be other circumstances, aside from ongoing emergencies,
when a statement is not procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for
trial testimony.") (emphasis in original).
228. Id. at 1155.
229. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(quoting Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911)).
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There is also significant textual and doctrinal support for refraining
the confrontation standard to focus on the distinction between
"witnessing" and speaking. Obviously, the text of the Sixth Amendment
refers only to "witnesses." As the Crawford Court explicitly recognized,
not all declarants whose statements are proffered by the prosecution at
trial are witnesses because "not all hearsay implicates the Sixth
Amendment's core concerns."230 Confrontation is principally guaranteed
for those who serve as witnesses by making "formal statement[s] to
government officers" 231 because, for example, a "recorded statement
knowingly given in response to structured police questioning qualifies
[for confrontation] under any conceivable definition."232 Moreover,
"'[a]n accuser who makes aformal statement to government officers"'233
is a witness because she "'bears testimony in a sense that a person who
makes a casual remark does not."' 2 34  Similarly, in Davis when the
victim made statements to the police during her mid-assault 911 call she
"was not acting as a witness; she was not testifying. . . . [and w]hat she
said was not a 'weaker substitute for live testimony' at trial . ... ."
Finally, the Bryant Court found that "the most important instances in
which the Clause restricts the introduction of out-of-court statements are
those in which state actors are involved in a formal, out-of-court
interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence for trial." 23 6
Further analytic support for a confrontation inquiry focused on the
act of witnessing can be found in the seminal work of Professor Akhil
Reed Amar. Indeed, Professor Amar had long argued that "the obvious
solution" to understanding what the Framers meant when they wrote the
Confrontation Clause "is to heed the word 'witness[]' and its ordinary
everyday meaning." 2 37  Professor Amar's interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause (which was cited by the Crawford Court)2 38 is
based on the sensible assumption that "'[a] Constitution that speaks in
the name of the people and that draws its legitimacy from ratification by
the people-ordinary citizens-should be presumed to use words in their
230. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
231. Id. (emphasis added).
232. Id. at 53 n.4 (emphasis added).
233. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 824 (2006) (quoting Crawford, 547 U.S. at 51).
234. Id. (quoting Crawford, 547 U.S. at 51).
235. Id. at 828 (quoting United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986)).
236. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011) (emphasis added).
237. Akhil R. Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 647 (1996).
238. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
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ordinary sense . . . ."239 Thus, to borrow his persuasive yet simple
example, "[i]f I tell my mom what I saw yesterday, and she later testifies
in court, I am not the witness; she is." 24 0
These arguments are consistent with Professor Amar's
"intratextualist" interpretation of constitutional text which reads "a
contested word or phrase that appears in the Constitution in light of
another passage in the Constitution featuring the same (or very similar
word) or phrase." 24 1 Thus, the definition of "witness" in the
Confrontation Clause must be consistent with the three other
constitutional clauses that use the word "witness," 24 2 the Treason
Clause, 24 3 the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause,'" and the
Compulsory Process Clause.24 5 Using both the "ordinary everyday
meaning" and the intertextualist approaches, Professor Amar has
repeatedly concluded that the Confrontation Clause "encompasses only
those 'witnesses' who testify either by taking the stand in person or via
government-prepared affidavits, depositions, videotapes, and the
like."246
Finally, by focusing on the witness, rather than the testimonial
nature of a statement, courts are likely to make more reliable and
consistent confrontation decisions. Although constitutional
determinations inevitably involve ambiguity and uncertainty, we must
start from the analysis proposed in Bryant which would force the federal
and state criminal courts to evaluate: (1) "the statements and actions of
both the declarant and interrogators;" 247 (2) whether the ongoing
emergency posed a threat to the public at large; 248 (3) the "informality in
an encounter between a victim and police;" 24 9 (4) "[t]he parties'
perception that an emergency is ongoing;, 250 (5) whether "the cause of
the shooting was a purely private dispute;" 251 (6) whether the suspect
239. Akhil R. Amar, Confrontation Clause First Principles: A Reply to Professor Friedman,
86 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1048 (1998).
240. Amar, supra note 237, at 647.
241. Akhil R. Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARv. L. REv. 747, 748 (1999).
242. Amar, supra note 237.
243. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
244. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
245. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
246. Amar, supra note 239, at 1045.
247. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1148 (2011).
248. Id at 1156.
249. Id. at 1160 (emphasis in original).
250. Id. at 1162 (emphasis added).
251. Id. at 1163.
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used a gun;252 (7) whether, at the time of the interrogation, the police
knew the location of the suspect;253 and (8) whether the police asked the
"type of questions necessary to allow the police to 'assess the situation,
the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential
victim' and to the public . . . .
It will not always be easy to determine which out-of-court
declarants have acted as "witnesses against the accused." However, to
the extent that assessing the act of "witnessing" shifts attention away
from a multifactor guessing game on the objective primary purpose of
the interrogation and towards more readily ascertainable external
circumstances (e.g., efforts by the police to shape or control the
victim's/witness's statement and/or facts that would indicate to a
reasonable victim/witness that her statement implicating the suspect
could have a trial purpose), this would enhance the legitimacy and
consistency of future confrontation decisions.
D. A Two-Pronged Confrontation Standard
Although Bryant hints of a possible return to the bad old pre-
Crawford days when confrontation decisions were based on evidentiary
reliability, a full retreat to this approach seems unlikely. 255 In the future,
the Court may build a variety of confrontation structures on its
Crawford/Davis/Bryant foundation. For example, the Court could adopt
a rebuttable two-pronged confrontation standard that might hew more
closely to the relevant text, clarify the process, and yet remain consistent
with the post-Crawford doctrine.
This approach would guarantee defendants the opportunity to
confront all out-of-court "witness against the accused" whose status as a
"witness" was established by the defense either:
(1) by ascertainable facts and circumstances demonstrating
that the making of the statement was the functional
equivalent of providing trial testimony; or in the alternative
(2) by ascertainable facts and circumstances demonstrating
that the making of the statement was the functional
252. Id. at 1164.
253. Id. at 1163.
254. Id. at 1166 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832 (2006)).
255. Id at 1155 ("In making the primary purpose determination, standard rules of hearsay,
designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant.").
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equivalent of providing testimony because the police and/or
the crime victim/witness understood and intended, or
should have understood and intended, that the
victim/witness was making a record that could be used to
prosecute the defendant.
Analysis of the facts under the first prong would be fairly
straightforward and should result in more predictable and consistent
judicial decisions. For example, the first prong could be satisfied: (1)
under all of the specific circumstances described in Crawford, (i.e.,
"prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a
former trial; and . . . police interrogations" 256); (2) with Professor
Amar's list of "affidavits, depositions, videotapes, and the like;" 257 or (3)
if, as (then) Solicitor General Kagan suggested in her Bryant brief, with
evidence of police control over the location, duration, and structure of
the victim/witness interview or evidence of any attempt by the police to
shape the statement for use in a future criminal trial.25 s
If the defendant lacked evidence to satisfy the first prong,
confrontation would be guaranteed only if the defense proffered relevant
and reliable evidence that the police or the victim/witness understood
and intended (or that a reasonable police officer or victim/witness in the
same circumstances would have understood and intended) that the
statement provided by the victim/witness could be used as inculpatory
evidence by the prosecutor at trial.
Like the current Crawford/Davis/Bryant inquiry, this two-pronged
analysis would require the Court to carefully consider dynamic mid-
investigation facts and circumstances. However, the inquiry would be
cabined by the Court's focus on evidence indicating that the out-of-court
declarant was effectively serving as a witness. In this context, formality
that does not rise to the level required by the first prong (along with any
of the seven other Bryant factors) would be considered only if this
evidence shed light on the question of whether the crime victim/witness
understood and intended, or should have understood and intended, that
she was making a record that could be used to prosecute the defendant.
This two-pronged approach is just one possible first step towards a
more consistent analytic process focused on the fundamental objective
of barring prosecutors from using ex parte testimony against the
256. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
257. Amar, supra note 239, at 1045.
258. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 175, at
17.
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accused. In many cases, this approach would yield results consistent
with the recent confrontation doctrine. For example, Sylvia Crawford's
written and Mirandized stationhouse statement, Amy Hammon's sworn
"battery affidavit," and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts'
"certificates of analysis" would all satisfy both prongs. Michelle
McCottry's mid-assault 911 call would not satisfy either prong. Finally,
Anthony Covington's identification of the defendant would clearly not
satisfy prong one and, given the limited police opportunity to develop,
structure, or control the victim's statement, under these circumstances
neither Mr. Covington, nor a reasonable victim, would have understood
and intended that by identifying his unapprehended assailant, he was
making a record that would be used at trial. However, as discussed
below, there are both legal and social costs to this approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the recent decision in Bryant, Justice Scalia has lost control of
the Court's confrontation jurisprudence. However, his rancorous view
that Bryant is an "opinion [that] distorts our Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence and leaves it in a shambles," 25 9 may prove prescient. He
may also be correct that Bryant will "create[] an expansive exception to
the Confrontation Clause for violent crimes" 2 60 that will be exploited by
future police and prosecutors. As new cases arise, criminal courts will
need to adapt to avoid fulfilling Justice Scalia's prediction that pre-
Crawford "reliability. . . [will return] to guide our Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence, at least where emergencies and faux emergencies are
concerned." This can and should be avoided, and some of the Bryant
"uncertainty . .. for law enforcement and the lower courts"261 corrected.
However, this Article concludes with an honest acknowledgment
that any effort to narrow the confrontation focus to enhance analytic and
operational consistency could have significant legal and social costs.
The first legal cost (which I raise here, but will elaborate on in
future work) is to defense challenges under Bruton v. United States. 262
In Bruton, the Supreme Court interpreted the Confrontation Clause to
bar the admission of a codefendant's confession implicating the other
defendant at a joint trial. Prior to Bruton, federal and state criminal
courts had generally assumed that confessions by one defendant that
259. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
260. Id.at1173.
261. Id. at 1174.
262. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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implicated a codefendant (i.e., an interlocking confession) could be
admitted without violating the Confrontation Clause if the judge
instructed the jury that the confession was admissible only against the
confessing codefendant.263 The Bruton Court recognized the naivety of
this solution: "[t]he fact of the matter is that too often such admonition
against misuse is intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such a
nonadmissible declaration cannot be wiped from the brains of the
jurors."2 64 After Bruton, federal and state prosecutors can only admit a
non-testifying codefendant's interlocking confession, if it has been
effectively redacted or if the defendants trial are severed and the
confession is introduced only against the defendant who made it. Over
the past forty years, the Court has further distinguished confessions that
explicitly and directly incriminated co-defendants from those that
incriminated co-defendants only inferentially when combined with other
evidence.265 The Court has also clarified that the Confrontation Clause
is violated even when the defendant's own confession (reciting
essentially the same information) was introduced at trial266 or if the
nontestifying codefendant's confession was ineffectively redacted.267
However, over the past seven years, federal and state criminal
courts have increasingly found that it is now "necessary to view Bruton
263. See, e.g., Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 238 (1957) (holding that it is possible
for jurors to follow jury instructions to disregard inculpatory references to a non-confessing co-
defendant).
264. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 129. The Bruton Court clarified the scope of their decision noting that
"in many cases the jury can and will follow the trial judge's instructions to disregard such
information. . . . [however,] there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or
cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that
the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored." Id. at 135.
265. In Richardson v. Marsh, the Court found that when a confession "was not incriminating
on its face, and became so only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial (the defendant's
own testimony)[,]. . . . it is a less valid generalization that the jury will not likely obey the
instruction to disregard the evidence." 481 U.S. 200, 208 (1987). See also United States v.
Spagnola, 632 F.3d 981, 988 (7th Cir. 2011) ("A Bruton violation occurs only if the confession of a
non-testifying co-defendant facially incriminates the non-confessing co-defendant.").
266. See Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 193 (1987) ("We hold, where a nontestifying
codefendant's confession incriminating the defendant is not directly admissible against the
defendant, the Confrontation Clause bars its admission at their joint trial, even if the jury is
instructed not to consider it against the defendant, and even if the defendant's own confession is
admitted against him.").
267. See Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 193 (1998) ("Redactions that simply replace a name
with an obvious blank space or a word such as 'deleted' or a symbol or other similarly obvious
indications of alteration, however, leave statements that, considered as a class, so closely resemble
Bruton's unredacted statements that, in our view, the law must require the same result."). See also
United States v. West, No. 08 CR 669, 2011 WL 1313706 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 2011) (finding that a
court "can and should consider the surrounding circumstances in determining whether the redacted
statement impermissibly identifies a non-testifying co-defendant").
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through the lens of Crawford and Davis."268 To the extent that a
clarification of the confrontation standard is used to limit its scope,
defendants will be increasingly barred from raising Bruton challenges to
inculpatory (but non-testimonial) out-of-court statements made by non-
testifying codefendants whenever this evidence survives hearsay
challenges (e.g., statements against interest, coconspirator statements).269
A second legal predictable cost is that law enforcement could
respond with new strategies and practices designed to prevent the
formalization (and thus enhance the admissibility) of crime
victim/witness statements.270 Presumably blatant police efforts to evade
confrontation would not be tolerated. As the Davis Court noted, it
would not be acceptable if "the protections of the Confrontation Clause
can readily be evaded by having a note-taking policeman recite the
unsworn testimony of the declarant, instead of having the declarant sign
a deposition.",27 1 Law enforcement agents would also be forced to weigh
the confrontation implications of formalization against a range of
competing investigatory and evidentiary benefits and concerns (e.g.,
preserving evidence, obtaining sworn statements). However, any shift in
police practices that enables police to insulate victims/witnesses who
provide inculpatory evidence from cross-examination would undermine
what Professor Andrew Taslitz has identified as "the primary, although
not necessarily sole, purpose of the Confrontation Clause [which] is
preventing governmental misconduct in the creation of evidence."272
268. United States v. Figueroa-Cartagena, 612 F.3d 69, 85 (1st Cir. 2010). See also United
States v. Dale, 614 F.3d 942 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that after Crawford the admission of a
nontestifying codefendant's interlocking confession recorded by a jail house informant did not
violate the defendant's right to confrontation because it was non-testimonial); United States v.
Johnson, 581 F.3d 320, 326 (6th Cir. 2009) ("the Bruton rule, like the confrontation clause itself,
does not apply to non-testimonial statements"); People v. Arceo, 195 Cal. App. 4th 556 (2011)
(same). But see United States v. Williams, No. 1:09cr414 (JCC), 2010 WL 3909480 (E.D. Va. Sept.
23, 2010) (rejecting the argument that, after Crawford, Bruton should be limited to testimonial
statements).
269. See, e.g., United States v. Dale, 614 F.3d 942 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that after Crawford
the admission of a nontestifying co-defendant's interlocking confession recorded by a jail house
informant did not violate the defendant's right to confrontation).
270. Joshua C. Dickinson, The Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay Rule: The Current State
ofa Failed Marriage in Need ofa Quick Divorce, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 763, 811 (2000) (noting
that "to distinguish between statements made in formalized testimonial setting versus informal
investigative setting, as Justice Thomas proposes . .. may encourage police and prosecutors shift the
emphasis of their investigation in more informal settings so as to avoid confrontation clause
problems").
271. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006) (emphasis in original).
272. Andrew E. Taslitz, What Remains ofReliability: Hearsay and Freestanding Due Process
after Crawford v. Washington, 20 CRIM. JUST. MAG. 39 (2005) (citing the pre-Crawford work of
Margaret Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a
Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557 (1992); Dickinson, supra note 270, at 803-07;
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A social cost, which would transcend state and federal law
enforcement, is the resulting diminished reliability of a wide range of
federal, state and local public records. The paradox of formality is that
under normal circumstances we require that certain statements be
formalized (e.g., affidavits, sworn statements, depositions) to ensure
their accuracy and reliability. For example, in Melendez-Diaz, state law
required that each of the three certificates of analysis be sworn to before
a notary public.273 The Massachusetts statute was designed to serve two
purposes: (1) to help ensure the accuracy of state forensic laboratory
analyses; and (2) to provide prima facie evidence of the composition,
quality, and weight of the tested substance that could be admitted in lieu
of live testimony.274 By requiring analyst confrontation, the Melendez-
Diaz Court focused solely on the second goal. However, over the past
few years Melendez-Diaz has been applied to an increasingly broad
range of government records formalized via affidavits, notarization,
certification or other processes. 275 This creates powerful incentives for a
wide range of government agencies to reduce or eliminate formalization
requirements, which presumably will diminish the accuracy of public
records and make it more difficult to penalize fraud and negligence.
No confrontation solution is perfect. When Justice Scalia wrote for
a unanimous Court in Crawford, his purported goal was to replace the
"inherently, and therefore permanently unpredictable" 276  rules of
evidence with a new confrontation inquiry that would better reflect the
constitutional text, the framer's intent, legal history, and core fair trial
principles. However, Justice Scalia's valiant seven-year effort to
prevent the admission of "statements that do consist of ex parte
testimony upon a mere finding of reliability" 277 is increasingly
Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1171, 1246-52
(2002)), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminaljustice-magazine-home/crimjust cjmag_20 2-t
aslitz.html.
273. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2009).
274. Id. at 2532 (providing that the "purpose of the affidavits was to provide 'prima facie
evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight' of the analyzed substance" (quoting MASS.
GEN. LAWS, ch. 111, § 13)).
275. Stephen N. Yermish, Melendez-Diaz and the Application of Crawford in the Lab, THE
CHAMPION, Aug. 29, 2009, at 28, 32 ("The decision in Melendez-Diaz has the potential to impact a
host of criminal cases beyond the drug possession case to which it was specifically directed.")
available at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsfl01cle7698280d20385256d0b00789923/ed3658d5274f862d852576
43005f5780?OpenDocument.
276. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 n.10 (2004) (emphasis in original).
277. Id. at 60 (emphasis in original).
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threatened by the Court's own confusing and ambiguous doctrine. The
Crawford Court was clearly correct that a defendant's right to confront
must trump federal and state evidence rules under many circumstances.
But the fair administration of justice demands that confrontation have a
sensible meaning and consistent effect so that these interests will be
protected in future criminal trials.
